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Abstract 
 
This paper distinguishes four types of Prisoners’ Dilemma games – provision, the commons, 
selfish, and altruism – based on the public character of benefits and costs.  Although each of 
these four games has the same 2 × 2 ordinal game form, each differs in terms of strategic, 
dynamic, and policy implications.  Similar differences characterize the n-person representations 
of the four games.  When paired in 3 × 3 representations, the least-desirable Nash equilibrium of 
the two embedded 2 × 2 games results.  The four types of PD games also have different 
evolutionary and informational requirements for cooperation.  Applications include the 
environment, biology, counterterrorism, and international relations. 
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Relations & Economics.  Their research was supported by the McCallum and Dockson 
endowments, respectively.THE DILEMMA OF THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMAS 
In a variety of social, economic, and political situations, the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) 
game is the most studied of the 78 distinct binary games.  When characterizing Olson’s (1965) 
analysis of collective action, Russell Hardin (1982, Chapter 2) goes so far as equating all 
collective action problems to Prisoners’ Dilemmas.  Although a variety of game forms are now 
associated with collective action problems (Sandler, 1992), there is no question that the PD game 
occupies a central place in the analysis of diverse social science phenomena.  PD games are used 
to investigate arms races, treaty adherence, the tragedy of the commons, counterterrorism, 
logrolling, public good provision, altruism, boycotts, and many other issues.
1 
With a few notable exceptions,
2 PD games are applied in a generic fashion as though all 
PD games possess identical strategic implications.  For binary strategies, researchers draw little 
differences among two-player and n-player PD games in a host of different social scenarios.  The 
ordinal representation, where payoffs are rank ordered, is often stressed, thereby hiding some of 
the essential strategic aspects that differentiate PD games.  To date, the importance between 
action and inaction is masked by focusing on cooperate and defect; yet, alternative PD games 
differ based on the dominance of action versus inaction.  The cooperate and defect strategies may 
involve action or inaction depending on the underlying PD game; the action/inaction distinction 
better informs policy.  Finally, the typical representations of PD games do not distinguish 
between public and private benefits versus public and private costs that are associated with the 
underlying strategies.  These distinctions are essential in truly understanding the strategic 
implications of alternative PD games.   
In fact, the public/private benefits and costs distinction gives rise to four classes of PD 
games under the names of provision, commons, altruism, and selfish.  A primary purpose of this 
paper is to demonstrate the conceptual gains from distinguishing among these four types of PDs.    2 
Insights involve the ability to show when action or inaction is required and when leadership is a 
help or a hindrance.  Moreover, strategic interactions greatly differ among the four alternative 
PDs.  An understanding of strategic, collective action, and other differences allow for more 
informed policy prescriptions in PD scenarios.  A secondary purpose is to examine the outcome 
when players can choose among three strategies so that two alternative PD games are embedded 
in the choice – e.g., the choice may involve altruism versus selfish behavior or contribution to a 
public good versus creating a public bad (a commons).  In these 3 × 3 game scenarios, the least 
desirable of the two embedded 2 × 2 games’ Nash equilibrium is chosen, leading us to 
characterize such choices as a Prisoners’ Dilemma squared (PD
2).  A third purpose is to relate 
the four PD games to strategic complements and strategic substitutes.  A fourth purpose is to 
provide a host of applications, so that the reader appreciates that the analysis impacts issues 
throughout the social and biological sciences.  Past studies have not differentiated sufficiently 
between the kinds of PDs that arise.  A final purpose is to draw other implications – e.g., we 
investigate the ability to achieve cooperation in repeated plays of the underlying PD games.  In 
so doing, we establish that public benefits facilitate cooperation in repeated plays, whereas 
public costs do not.  Furthermore, the reciprocity requirement for cooperation is mathematically 
identical to group effects in an evolutionary context. 
The remainder of the paper contains five sections.  Section 1 presents the identifying 
characteristics of the four PD games for both two-player and n-player representations.  
Applications to the environment, biology, international relations, and counterterrorism are 
presented.  In Section 2, binary comparisons of the four PD games are presented, while, in 
Section 3, strategic implications are investigated.  Section 4 presents implications for repeated 
and evolutionary games.  Finally, concluding remarks are contained in Section 5. 
   3 
1.  Four Faces of the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
In Figure 1, the four panels indicate the four alternative 2 × 2 normal forms for the PD 
game.  Each of these games involves two players – player 1 and player 2 – and two strategies – 
action and inaction.  The provision or contribution game in panel a is the classic pure public 
good scenario where action is to contribute a unit of the public good.  Each unit contributed gives 
a public benefit of B to both players at a private cost of c to just the contributor.  If both players 
provide a unit of the public good, then each player nets a payoff of 2B − c as provision cost is 
deducted from aggregate benefit of 2B, received from one’s own provision and that of the other 
provider.  When only one player contributes, the contributor gains B − c and the other player free 
rides for a payoff of B.  Mutual inaction results in payoffs of 0.  The inequality 2B > c > B 
ensures that this is a PD game with a dominant strategy of inaction and a Nash equilibrium of 
mutual inaction, whose payoffs are boldfaced.  If we were to ordinally rank the payoffs, we 
would get the Prisoner’s Dilemma array.  The mutual inaction equilibrium is associated with 
smaller payoffs than mutual action; thus, too little of the pure public good is the outcome.   
In panel b of Figure 1, the commons game is displayed, where action gives rise to a 
private benefit of b for the one taking action and a public cost of C for both players.  This public 
cost is associated with each unit of action, which can be grazing one’s herd on a commons or 
plying a fishing ground.  For simplicity, each player exerts the same level of action (i.e., one 
unit) if they choose to exploit the commons.  The commons game can also serve as a generic for 
a “public bad” where individual action has a negative consequence for everyone, but a net 
positive payoff for the individual if acting alone, so that b > C.  Mutual action yields b − 2C for 
both players as the public cost, 2C, of two units of action is deducted from the private benefit.  If 
one player exploits the commons alone, then the exploiter nets b − C and the passive player loses 
−C from the associated public cost.  Mutual inaction gives 0.  The inequality 2C > b > C ensures   4 
that the game is a PD.  The dominant strategy is now action, since b − 2C > −C and b − C > 0, 
so that a Nash equilibrium of mutual action follows.  Unlike the provision game, there is too 
much action.  These two games differ owing to the nature of the benefits and costs:  in the 
provision game, benefits are public and costs are private; while, in the commons game, costs are 
public and benefits are private.  
Applications abound for the provision and commons game.  From an environmental 
standpoint, curbing pollutants or cleansing an ecosystem represents a provision game.  Each unit 
of provision adds cumulatively to the overall benefits received.  Kin selection constitutes a 
provision game where individual action adds to the fitness of genetic relatives.  Kin selection is 
epitomized by biologist J. S. Haldane’s quip, “I’d gladly lay down my life for two brothers or 
eight cousins,” in reference to the fact that siblings share one-half of their genes and cousins one-
eighth, thereby implying a public benefit among genetic relatives.  In international relations, 
peacekeeping is an example of the provision game, while preemption of a common terrorist 
threat is another instance (Sandler and Siqueira, 2003).  Exploitation of a common hunting 
ground is an obvious example of the commons game.  In biology, approaching an ecosystem’s 
carrying capacity (where the system’s regenerative abilities decline) through use is also a 
commons game.  Rent seeking by lobbyists is a political example, where enhanced competition 
lowers the net gain for the successful lobbyist.  Actions to deter a terrorist attack by hardening 
targets are an international relations instance of the commons game:  nations engage in a 
deterrence race to deflect terrorist attacks to another venue.  Ironically, such efforts may merely 
divert the attack to another country where the deflector’s citizens are the target (Sandler, 2003). 
The next two forms of the PD involve only private benefits and private costs.  In the 
bottom left panel of Figure 1, the altruism game is displayed where action provides a benefit of b 
to the other player at a personal cost of C to the altruist, in which b > C > 0.  If player i is   5 
altruistic alone, then he or she incurs a loss of −C, but confers a benefit of b to the other player.  
When both players are altruistic, both receive a positive net gain of b − C.  Thus, mutual altruism 
improves both players’ well-being as compared with mutual inaction where nothing is received.  
Biological altruism is fitness reducing for the actor and fitness enhancing for the recipient, with 
no genetic relation necessarily implied.  In international relations, diplomacy abides by altruism 
as does sharing information between authorities about terrorists or criminals whose capture can 
aid another country but not the government providing the information.  Altruism may also 
correspond to a pollution scenario where country 1 causes river pollution in downstream country 
2, while country 2 causes air pollution in downwind country 1.  Mutual altruism can lead to net 
gains in both countries, but acting alone comes at an individual cost owing to the uni-directional 
aspects of the pollutants.  The dominant strategy in the altruism game is inaction, because b > b 
− C and 0 > −C.  Thus, the mutual-inaction Nash equilibrium results with the boldfaced payoffs. 
In panel d, the “selfish” game is displayed where action means taking from the other 
player, so that the taker gets B at a cost of c to the victim whose assets are stolen, where c > B > 
0.  If a single player appropriates the possessions of another, then the appropriator receives B and 
the victim sustains a loss of −c.  Mutual selfishness results in a net loss of B − c < 0.  Given the 
assumed inequality, this is a PD where action (taking) is the dominant strategy with a Nash 
equilibrium of mutual action or selfishness.  The selfish game corresponds to neighbors poaching 
from one another.  In biology, predation in neighboring territories is a selfish game.  
Appropriative behavior can represent this game in international relations as can the breaking of 
an embargo. 
Externalities (or uncompensated interdependencies) are integrally related to the four 
kinds of PD games.  The provision game represents a case of a positive general externality, 
while the commons game incorporates a negative general externality.  Generality arises from the   6 
publicness of benefits or costs, where each person’s action impinges on everyone in an 
uncompensated manner.  Altruism corresponds to a positive specific externality where one 
person’s action benefits another person.  In contrast, selfishness relates to a negative specific 
externality where one person’s action harms someone else.  In the latter two instances, the 
specificity of the externality may arise with a uni-directional externality.  If, for example, an 
upstream country limits its waste effluence, then altruism arises from a uni-directional positive 
externality conferred on a downstream country. 
Next, we turn to n-player representations of these games.  In Figure 2, 6-person 
generalizations of the provision and altruism games are presented in the two panels.  All players 
are assumed to be identical so that we depict the two strategies of representative player i.  The 
payoffs listed are those of i corresponding to the number of providers (altruists) other than i and, 
therefore, also the number of nonproviders (nonaltruists) other than i.  For the provision game in 
panel a, i’s inaction in the bottom row yields the free-rider payoffs according to how many other 
players provide a unit of the public good.  If just one other provides a unit, then i receives B.  
When two players (not including i) provide a unit apiece, i receives 2B.  As a free rider, i gets nB 
where n is the number of contributors other than i.  When i contributes alone, i’s net payoff is B 
− c.  If, say, i and two others provide units of the public good, then i nets 3B − c.  The remaining 
payoffs in the top row are computed in a similar fashion.  The payoffs in the bottom row are 
larger than the corresponding payoffs of the top row by c − B, so that inaction or not contributing 
is the dominant strategy for the representative, and hence every, player.  As each player exercises 
his or her dominant strategy, the Nash equilibrium of no one contributing results, whose 0 payoff 
is boldfaced.  The social optimum corresponds to everyone contributing for a payoff per player 
of 6B − c.   
If the commons game is also generalized to six persons, then a similar 2 × 6 matrix game   7 
(not shown) applies.  For i’s inaction, i’s payoff equals the negative of the product of the number 
of other players who exploit the commons times C.  As an exploiter, i nets b − C if no one else 
takes action and b − nC if others act, where n is the number of exploiters including player i.  
Now action is the dominant strategy because each payoff in the action row exceeds the 
corresponding payoff in the inaction row by b − C.  The Nash equilibrium involves everyone 
utilizing the commons, while the social optimum, whose payoffs are 0, involves universal 
inaction.  At the Nash equilibrium, each player loses b − 6C, which worsens with group size.
3  
The Nash and social optimum switch positions between the provision and commons game as 
dominance changes from inaction to action.   
In the bottom panel of Figure 2, a symmetric version of a six-person altruism game is 
displayed.  If player i gives nothing to others, then i receives benefits from the altruism of others.  
Moreoever, i’s altruism can go to any of the other five players.  Suppose that i is inactive and 
there are three altruists.  Player i’s likelihood of receiving b is 3/5 for an expected gain of 3b/5.  
The other payoffs in the bottom row are computed similarly.  When i is an altruist, i’s expected 
payoff is (3b/5) − C for three other altruists as i must cover the cost of altruism.  The other 
payoffs are determined analogously.  The dominant strategy is inaction as the payoffs in the 
bottom row are larger than the corresponding action payoffs by C.  The Nash equilibrium is 
universal inaction, while the social optimum is universal action.  Even for n players, the private 
nature of the altruism game is seen by comparing the corresponding payoffs in the right-most 
column of the two games, where the numbers of players only enters the payoff for the social 
optimum of the provision game. 
Finally, we turn to the 6-person symmetric version of the selfish game, whose matrix is 
suppressed.  If player i is inactive, then i faces a probabilistic loss depending on the number of 
selfish others.  If, for instance, four others steal from one person apiece, then i’s expected loss is   8 
−4c/5.  When i is also a thief in this scenario, i’s net payoff is B − (4c/5).  The other payoffs are 
computed in a similar fashion.  Action or stealing is the dominant strategy since the action row’s 
payoffs exceed the inaction row’s corresponding payoffs by B.  The Nash equilibrium involves 
selfish behavior all around, while the social optimum consists of no selfish behavior.  Compared 
with altruism, the position of Nash equilibrium and social optimum switch positions in the 
selfish game.  If exploitation were investigated among heterogeneous players, then the large is 
exploited by the small in the altruism game while the small is the prey to the large in the selfish 
game. 
 
2.  Prisoners’ Dilemmas Squared   
This section examines binary comparisons of the four types of PD games.  We return to 
the two-player representations of the four canonical PD games, where players are simultaneously 
confronted with two alternative PD games.  The six possible two-game pairings are analyzed 
along with real-world applications of each.  We first consider the pairing of the provision and 
commons game, in which each player has three strategies:  provide a unit of the public good (i.e., 
provide), inaction, or exploit the commons (denoted by graze).  This scenario could apply to 
counterterrorism where the public good is to preempt a terrorist attack by going after a terrorist 
group’s members or infrastructure (e.g., attacking al-Qaida in Afghanistan), while the commons 
or public cost scenario is to deter a terrorist attack by hardening a target (Sandler and Siqueira, 
2003).  The public cost arises as such actions deflect the attack to another venue, thereby creating 
an external cost for less-protected potential targets.  Another example of this pairing is associated 
with participating in a boycott (i.e., the public good) against a rogue nation bent on acquiring 
nuclear weapons or selling weapon components (i.e., the public bad) to the rogue.
4  By selling 
components, a nation creates a public cost by putting every nation at risk.   9 
In panel a of Figure 3, the associated 3 × 3 game matrix is displayed.  The top 2 × 2 
embedded matrix is the provision game, while the bottom 2 × 2 embedded matrix is the 
commons game.  Only the payoffs in the upper northeast and lower southwest cells must be 
computed, since the other payoffs correspond to those in panels a and b of Figure 1.  If player 1 
exploits the commons, while player 2 provides the public good, then player 1 receives B + b 
from the associated public and private benefits and must deduct the public cost C associated with 
1’s exploitation of the commons (i.e., grazing).  Player 2 only receives the benefit from 
providing a unit of the public good and must cover provision cost and endure the public cost of 
the commons for a net payoff of B − c − C.  When roles are reversed in the upper northeast cell, 
the payoffs are also reversed.  Exploiting the commons dominates both the provide and inaction 
strategies, so that the Nash equilibrium of mutual exploitation with boldfaced negative payoffs of 
b − 2C follows.  Of the two embedded PD games, the least desirable Nash equilibrium reigns, 
thus, leading us to describe the situation as PD
2.  Ironically, the Nash equilibrium represents the 
smallest summed payoffs of the nine cells. 
Next, we examine pairing a provision and a selfish game.  This situation could represent 
a case where nations can either send peacekeepers to a civil war (i.e., the public good) or sell 
weapons to one or more warring factions for profit.  In an environmental scenario, this pairing 
relates to efforts to preserve a habitat versus those to poach its species.  Now, the embedded 2 × 
2 PD games of panel b of Figure 3 are the provision and selfish games previously displayed in 
panels a and d of Figure 1.  The only payoffs that require explaining are those in the lower and 
upper corners of the off-diagonal.  If player 2 provides the public good for mutual benefit with 
selfish player 1, then the latter gains 2B from the public good and what he or she takes from 
player 2, while player 2 nets B − 2c as the costs from public provision and 1’s theft are deducted 
from the provision benefit of B.  These payoffs are reversed for the players in the upper northeast   10 
cell.  Selfishness dominates the inaction and provide strategies, leaving mutual selfishness as the 
Nash equilibrium with the lowest summed payoffs of the nine cells.  Once again, the situation is 
PD
2 as the least desirable of the two embedded PD games’ Nash equilibriums rules.   
In the bottom panel of Figure 3, the commons game is joined with the selfish game, so 
that two unsavory options are combined.  This combination can correspond to a scenario where a 
player can cause either a generalized externality by dumping waste in a public park or a specific 
externality by dumping the same waste on private land.  In one situation, costs are public and, in 
the other, they are private.  If player 1 is selfish and player 2 exploits the commons, then player 1 
nets B − C  as selfish gains are reduced by the public cost of the commons, while player 2 gains 
b from the commons but must cover the cost associated with exploiting the commons as well as 
the loss from 1’s selfishness for a payoff of b − C − c.  If roles are reversed in the upper 
northeast cell, then so too are payoffs.  Both the exploitation and selfish strategies individually 
dominates inaction.  Dominance between the selfish and graze strategies hinges on the associated 
relative gains from unilateral action.  If the net benefit from unilateral action in the commons 
exceeds that from unilateral selfishness (i.e., b − C > B), then graze is the dominant strategy with 
universal exploitation of the commons as the Nash equilibrium.  When, instead, this inequality is 
reversed, selfishness is the dominant strategy and universal selfishness is the Nash equilibrium.  
Although the summed payoff of this equilibrium need not be the smallest in the matrix, it is 
among the smallest available total. 
The remaining three binary comparisons are displayed in Figure 4.  Since the calculation 
of the benefits and costs are the same as before, we will streamline the presentation.  In panel a, 
the provision game is paired with altruism.  Because this pairing has positive gains in eight of the 
nine cells, the outcome looks hopeful.  In a biological setting, this combination may refer to a 
choice between kin selection or an individual altruistic act.  As we use the terms, the former   11 
increases fitness among genetic relatives, while the latter advances the fitness of a specific 
individual, with no necessary genetic relationship.  Providing a public good represents the 
provision strategy, whereas giving charity to another person constitutes altruism.  For both 
strategies, action costs the agent either c or C.  Effort to find a cure for a disease is a provision 
game, while action to treat a sick individual is an altruism game.  The dominant strategy in the 
normal-form game in panel a is inaction so that mutual inaction with the smallest summed 
payoffs is the Nash equilibrium.  A PD
2 outcome follows in which inaction dominates both 
forms of desirable action. 
In panel b of Figure 4, the commons game is paired with altruism, where each individual 
must choose between an action with individual benefit and public cost or an action with a benefit 
to another at a private cost to the altruist.  Exploiting the commons or graze is the dominant 
strategy.  The Nash equilibrium of mutual exploitation results with the smallest summed payoffs 
among the nine cells, thereby giving another instance of PD
2. 
The final pairing in panel c of Figure 4 combines altruism and selfishness.  This scenario 
applies to a situation where the two players must choose among three strategies:  a selfless act 
that benefits another at a personal cost, a selfish act that takes from another, or to do nothing.  In 
international relations, a choice between establishing diplomatic relations or pursuing a territorial 
dispute may represent this dual dilemma.  From literature, this pairing corresponds to the 
relationship between Scarpia and Tosca in Puccini’s opera, Tosca.  Scarpia, the chief of police, 
can fake the execution of Tosca’s lover in return for her favors (i.e., the altruism game).  By 
ordering the execution, Scarpia is engaging in the selfish game.  Many great tragedies in 
literature combine these two games.  In panel c, the dominant strategy is to be selfish with 
mutual selfishness as the Nash equilibrium.  A PD
2 again results, consistent with the resolution 
in Tosca and many great tragedies as greed or malice wins out over selfless good deeds.   12 
Table 1 provides a summary of the six distinct pairings of the four PD games.  The 
diagonal cells are blackened because a distinct pairing does not involve combining a given PD 
game with itself.  Twelve cells are relevant as game a can be combined with game b or vice 
versa.  In each cell, the dominant strategy from the pairing is indicated.  When the selfish and 
commons games are joined, selfish (S) or graze (G) is the dominant strategy depending on the 
inequality associated with unilateral exploitation or selfishness.  As seen from the table, the 
undesirable action dominates the desirable action in four of the pairings.  Inaction dominates 
when both actions are desirable, while the outcome is ambiguous, but not promising, when both 
actions are undesirable.   
 
3.  Strategic Implications 
The four PD games have vastly different strategic implications, which can be displayed in 
a continuous-variable representation.  In particular, the Nash reaction paths are of interest.  These 
reaction paths indicate each player’s choice of an action, given the other player’s choice of the 
action, denoted by the continuous variable Ai, i = 1, 2.  Given the presence of just private benefits 
and costs for the selfish and altruism game, the associated reaction paths display no interaction; 
i’s reaction path is vertical when Ai is on the horizontal axis and Aj is on the vertical axis.  This 
follows because the choice for Ai is independent of that for Aj, insofar as the privateness of 
benefits and costs means that the other player’s action does not influence one’s own desire for 
selfishness or altruism.  In contrast, the publicness of benefits and costs in the case of the public 
good and the commons gives rise to strategic interactions that distinguish the two cases.  To 
draw out these differences, a generic model is put forward that can capture both cases depending 
on assumptions. 
Each of the two players chooses a private numèraire good, xi, and an action, Ai.  The i
th   13 
person’s utility function, U
i, is: 
  () , , ,
ii
ii j UU x L A A  =     , 1,2, and  , i ji j =≠  (1) 
where L indicates some output produced by combining actions for both individuals.  We assume 
that both x and L add to utility, whose marginal utility is diminishing in both arguments.  
Moreover, the cross utility partial, UxL, is assumed to be positive.  For the provision game, L is 
the level of public good provision derived from individual contributions, Ai and Aj; for the 
commons, L is the level of associated benefit or cost stemming from exploitation by the two 
individuals.  Each individual faces the following linear budget constraint:   
  , i ii i x cA I +=     1,2, i =  (2) 
where the price of xi is one, ci is the unit price of Ai, and Ii is income. 
The real strategic difference is tied to the manner in which the players’ actions produce 
the common consequence, L.  For the provision scenarios, both players’ contributions enhance L 
so that Li > 0 and Lj > 0, where subscripts on L denotes partial derivatives – e.g.,  /. ii L LA =∂ ∂   
Moreover, Lij < 0 so that the marginal impact of Ai on L declines with Aj owing to the two 
activities being substitutes.  In fact, these assumptions are sufficient for public good 
contributions to be strategic substitutes.
5  For the commons, we assume that Li > 0, Lj < 0, and Lij 
> 0.  The second inequality indicates that the actions of others reduce L (e.g., gives a cost from 
exploitation), while the third inequality reflects that the marginal impact of i’s action on L 
increases with more action by j.  In a commons, this positive cross partial corresponds to the 
crowding costs of a commons, in which each agent’s action exacerbates these costs.  As such, the 
commons is a case of strategic complements, where one individual’s action induces more action 
from the other individual. 
By substituting the income constraint for x into the utility function in (1), we can express   14 
i’s constrained maximization problem as:   
  () maximize , , ,
i
i
ii i i j A UIc A L A A  −     , 1,2, and  . i ji j =≠  (3) 
The Nash equilibrium’s first-order condition for this generic problem is: 
 − 0,
ii
ix iL cU LU +=   i = 1, 2,  (4) 
or 
  ,
i
i Lx i LMRS c =    i = 1, 2,  (5) 
where the weighted marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of L for x is equated to the unit price of 
A.
6  The weight indicates the marginal impact of Ai on L.  The Pareto optimum is found by 
maximizing the utility of individual i subject to the constancy of j’s utility and to an additive 
budget constraint for the two individuals.  The resulting Pareto optimum is: 
 
2
1
,    , 1,2,    .
i
iL x i
j
L MRS c i j i j
=
== ≠ ∑  (6) 
The distinction between strategic substitutes and complements comes into play when comparing 
the Nash equilibrium Ai satisfying eq. (5) with the Pareto optimal Ai satisfying eq. (6).  The 
Pareto-optimal condition has an extra 
j
i Lx LMRS  term on the left-hand side that indicates i’s action 
on the marginal well-being of j owing to the publicness of both problems.  For substitutes, this 
term is positive, so that Nash behavior implies underprovision, while, for complements, this term 
is negative so that Nash behavior implies overprovision.  Both findings are consistent with our 
discrete 2 × 2 models in Section 1 where provision is undersupplied and exploitation of the 
commons is oversupplied. 
Next consider the slope of the Nash reaction path which follows from implicit 
differentiation of the first-order condition in eq. (4).
7  The reciprocal slope for i’s reaction path 
is:   15 
  22 .
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 (7) 
If the second-order condition holds so that the denominator is negative, then the sign of the 
reciprocal slope in eq. (7) hinges on the sign of the bracketed expression in the numerator.  
Given our assumptions on the utility function (e.g., 
i
xL U  > 0), the bracketed term and, therefore, 
ij dAd A  or  j i dAd A  is negative (positive) for strategic substitutes (complements) in the case of 
the provision (commons) game.  In Figure 5, linearized depictions of the reaction paths are 
shown for the two scenarios.  Point N is the Nash equilibrium that satisfies the two reaction paths 
(N1 for player 1 and N2 for player 2), while point P is the Pareto optimum.  The relative positions 
of N and P indicate Nash underprovision for the provision game; their relative positions indicate 
Nash oversupply for the commons game. 
There is more that can differ strategically between these two games.  Consider leader-
follower behavior where player 1 is the leader who uses the follower’s Nash reaction path as a 
constraint.  The leader’s optimization problem is to choose A1 to 
 maximize  () ()
1
11 1 1 2 1 , , , UIc A L A AA  −   (8) 
where A2(A1) is the follower’s Nash reaction path.  As follower, player 2 abides by Nash 
behavior.  The first-order condition associated with the leader’s optimization problem is: 
  ()
11 1
112 2 1 0, xLL cU LU L U dA dA −+ + =  (9) 
which differs from the Nash first-order condition by the addition of the third left-hand term.  In 
the provision game, this term is negative (because L2 > 0 and  21 0) dA dA <  and is an 
externalizing influence that causes the leader to limit contributions compared with Nash 
behavior.  The leader knows that reducing contributions shift some of the burden onto the 
follower owing to the negative slope of the reaction path.  Thus, the leader-follower equilibrium,   16 
S, in Figure 5a is to the left of N on 2’s reaction path.  As a consequence, leader-follower 
behavior exacerbates inefficiency in the provision game.  The opposite holds true to the 
commons game where the extra term is again negative (because L2 < 0 and  21 0). dA dA >   This 
extra term in eq. (9) now performs an internalizing function as the leader realizes that his or her 
exploitation induces similar behavior in the follower and so cuts down on overexploitation.  In 
Figure 5b, the leader-follower equilibrium S lies to the left of N and can improve things if the 
cutback is not too great.  Other differences between these two PD games arise from comparative 
static changes that shift the reaction paths. 
When these PD games are generalized to continuous choices for the action variable, 
differences among the four types of PD games become prominent.  Many results for the 
provision and commons games are opposite to one another, while the selfish and altruism games 
lack much strategic interest in terms of the reaction path. 
 
4.  Cooperation:  Reciprocity, Group Effects, and Information 
  The payoffs of any of the 2 ×  2 versions of the PD game can be associated with the 
symbols T, R, P, and S, corresponding to the ordinal ranking of T > R > P > S.  For example, in 
the altruism game, T = b, R = b – C, P = 0 and S = –C.  Furthermore, payoffs are additive with R 
+ P = S + T.   In this context, the notion of cooperation is unambiguous – it is the strategy 
combination where each player receives a payoff of R (reward).  Cooperation refers to a payoff 
rather than a strategy.  Hence, in some instances, cooperation requires mutual action (for 
provision and altruism) and in others it requires mutual inaction (for commons, and selfish).  
There are several ways that cooperation can be established in the PD, and each requirement can 
be expressed as a function of T, R, P, and S.  The potential for cooperation is shown to vary with 
the underlying type of PD game.     17 
We first examine reciprocity in the iterated PD.  In a finitely iterated PD with an 
unknown number of rounds, δ  is defined to be the probability that the current period is not the 
last period of play.  Equivalently, δ  is the discount factor in the infinitely repeated PD.  Tit-for-
tat (TFT) is the most well-known example of reciprocity in the iterated PD.  When TFT leads off 
with action (A) in an iterated altruism game, mutual TFT supports a discounted payoff of R/(1 – 
δ ) per player.  The best an inactive (I) player can earn against TFT is (T – P) + P/(1 – δ ).  TFT is 
a Nash equilibrium if R/(1 – δ ) ≥  (T – P) + P/(1 – δ ); i.e., the general condition for reciprocity is 
  δ  ≥   (T – R)/(T – P) .           ( 1 0 )  
An alternative cooperative mechanism is the evolution of group effects (Wilson and 
Sober, 1994), whereby agents of a certain type/strategy within a population may be more likely 
to have pairwise interactions with others of their own type than random chance would indicate.  
For example, in the altruism game, altruists earn a payoff of R in an own-type (assortative) 
matching, while nonaltruists earn P in an assortative encounter.  In nonassortative matchings, 
altruists receive S and nonaltruists receive T.  If x is the population proportion of altruists, then 
a(x) = p(x) – q(x) is the index of assortativity – the difference between the conditional probability 
that an altruist meets an altruist, p(x), and the conditional probability that a nonaltruist meets an 
altruist, q(x) (Bergstrom, 2003).  The expected payoff for an altruist is p(x)R + [1 – p(x)]S, 
whereas the expected payoff for a nonaltruist is q(x)T + [1 – q(x)]P.  Given that payoffs are 
additive, the difference between these two payoffs, ∆ (x), is ∆ (x) = S – P + a(x)(T – P).  Altruism 
is monotonically stable when ∆ (x) > 0, which reduces to a(x) > (T – R)/(T – P).  This is the strict 
version of eq. (10) where δ  is replaced by a(x).  This previously unidentified insight can be 
interpreted as follows:  assortativity is a perfect substitute for reciprocity in establishing 
cooperation for additive PDs.  We, thus, use eq. (10) to partially rank the requirements for 
cooperation across PDs.  A smaller lower bound, (T – R)/(T – P), means that cooperation is   18 
easier to achieve, because it can occur under a smaller lower discount factor or a smaller index 
of assortativity. 
By comparing eq. (10) across PDs, we arrive at a novel insight on the nature of 
reciprocal/assortative cooperation:  public benefits of action facilitate cooperation, but public 
costs of action make cooperation more difficult.  To see this, refer to Figure 1.  In the provision 
game, T = B, R = 2B – c, P = 0, and S = B – c.  In the selfish game T′  = B, R′  = 0, P′  = B – c, 
and S′ = –c.  From eq. (10), the lower bound for cooperation in the provision game is (T – R)/(T 
– P) = (c – B)/B, while this bound in the selfish game is (T′  – R′ )/(T′ – P′ ) = B/c, which can be 
expressed in terms of the provision payoffs as B/c = T/(T – S).  Since (T – R)/(T – P) < T/(T – S), 
cooperation is easier to establish for provision as compared to selfish.  Similarly, for the 
commons, we set T ˆ  = b – C, R ˆ  = 0, P ˆ  = b – 2C, and S ˆ  = –C, and for altruism, we set T
~ = b, 
R
~ = b – C, P
~ = 0, and S
~
 = –C.  Because (T
~–R
~)/(T
~– P
~) = C/b = –S ˆ /(T ˆ – S ˆ ), and (T ˆ – 
R ˆ )/(T ˆ – P ˆ ) > –S ˆ /(T ˆ – S ˆ ), altruistic cooperation is easier than cooperation in the commons.  No 
further rankings of lower bounds (e.g., altruism versus selfish) are possible without imposing 
additional structure on the model. 
Wilson and Sober (1994, pp. 591-3) argue that a necessary condition for selection to take 
place at the group level is for traits/strategies to share the same fate.  If a strategy has a (general) 
public benefit, this enhances the group’s common fate.  If, conversely, a strategy has a public 
cost, this decreases the group’s fate, thereby implying a need for increased assortativity to 
achieve cooperation.  This is exactly what we find when comparing the provision game with the 
selfish game and the commons game with the altruism game.   
  Finally, the PDs have different informational requirements for cooperation.  Consider an 
imperfect information version of the altruism (or provision) game, where a player is uncertain 
whether she is moving first or after the other player selected action (A).  This is illustrated in   19 
Figure 6.
8  Nature (ñ) moves first and establishes both the order of moves and the information set 
for player i, denoted by hi, i = 1, 2.  If the other player selects A at his information set, then 
player i’s expected payoff for A is R, and the expected payoff for I is .5T + .5P.  By symmetry, 
(A, A) is a Nash equilibrium if R ≥  .5T + .5P or   
  R – P ≥  T – R.            ( 1 1 )  
Nishihara (1997) established that if this inequality does not hold, then R cannot be an equilibrium 
payoff for all other (static) versions of the PD with imperfect information.  This is the coarsest 
information structure that will support cooperation in a static PD.  In this information structure, 
players are uninformed about the order of moves, but know whether someone has selected I 
before them (or A for commons and selfish), whereas in the game boxes in Figure 1 players have 
no knowledge about previous moves. 
The informational condition for cooperation in eq. (11) is fundamentally different from the 
reciprocity/assortative condition in eq. (10).  For example, when 2B > c > B > 0 and 2C > b > C 
> 0 so all four versions of the PD hold simultaneously, the altruism and selfish games violate eq. 
(11).  Coarse (imperfect) information will not support R as an equilibrium payoff for these PDs.   
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Although the ordinal forms for the four PD games are identical, there are many essential 
differences of these games that arise from the public/private character of benefits and costs.  For 
instance, this publicness determines the slopes of the Nash reaction paths for the provision and 
commons game and, thus, influences the implications of leader-follower behavior as well as the 
relative positions of the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto optimum.  As such, policy prescriptions 
differ greatly between the provision and commons games – e.g., the introduction of additional 
agent-specific benefits that shift a reaction path can lead to different outcomes for the two   20 
problems.  For the selfish and altruism games, there is much less strategic interaction owing to 
the underlying uni-directional externalities and the privateness of benefits and costs.  Collective 
action impacts can also vary:  group size is a more essential consideration for the provision and 
commons PD games than for the selfish and altruism PD games.  This follows from the public 
consequences in the first two games and the private implications in the second two games.  
Moreover, our analysis suggests that labeling strategies in the 2 × 2 PD as action versus inaction 
is preferable to the traditional use of cooperate and defect, because action is desirable in some 
PDs (i.e., provision and altruism), whereas inaction is ideal in others (i.e., commons and selfish).   
When these four PD games are paired in 3 × 3 representations, the equilibrium gravitates 
to the least desirable Nash equilibrium of the embedded 2 × 2 games.  This pessimistic 
realization gives a whole new meaning to dilemma in the term Prisoners’ Dilemma that we 
interpret as PD
2.  If, however, the paired games have potentially desirable outcomes (i.e., 
provision and altruism pairing), then the inaction Nash equilibrium shared by the two embedded 
2 × 2 games is the outcome.  Differences in the cooperative and evolutionary implications of 
these four PD games are also analyzed in a repeated-game framework.  Finally, a host of 
applications are indicated, drawn from the environment, biology, international relations, and 
counterterrorism policy.  These applications underscore the far-reaching consequences of our 
investigation for a variety of problems.    21 
Footnotes 
1.  The following sources address these issues with a PD game:  arms race, Wagner 
(1983); treaty adherence, Sandler (1997); the commons, Hardin (1968); counterterrorism, Arce 
and Sandler (2004); logrolling, Mueller (2003, p. 119); public goods, Sandler and Arce (2003); 
altruism, Wilson and Sober (1994); and boycotts, Sandler (1992). 
2.  Exceptions include Hamburger (1973), Komorita (1987), and Sandler and Arce 
(2003).  These previous pieces have only distinguished between two forms of PD games in ways 
that differ from our analysis.  The investigation here involves four PD representations and 
pairwise interactions among alternative PD games.  The approach here is novel. 
3.  In a different exercise, Sandler and Arce (2003) show that the exploitation hypothesis 
differs for the provision and commons games when players are heterogeneous.  For provision, 
the large player shoulders a disproportionate burden for the smaller player – the standard Olson 
(1965) hypothesis.  However, for the commons, the small is exploited because the large creates a 
disproportionate amount of the public costs for the small exploiters. 
4.  The paid-rider problem identified by Lee (1988) is another instance of a paired 
provision (proactive measures against terrorists) and commons game (giving terrorists a safe 
haven). 
5.  On strategic substitutes and strategic complements, see Bulow, Geanakoplos, and 
Klemperer (1985). 
6.  () () .
ii i
Lxi MRS U L U x =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
7.  These reaction paths correspond to the minimums (for the provision game) and the 
maximums (for the commons game) of the constrained isoutility curves (not displayed).  For 
provision, these isoutility curves are U-shaped; for the commons, they are hill shaped (see 
Cornes and Sandler, 1996).     22 
8.  We truncate the game after a player selects I  at the node where the player moves 
first, because in this case the other player knows I has been selected (it is perfect information); 
consequently, the other player will select I  (because it is strictly dominant at this point in the 
game) and each player will receive P.  If the game is instead the commons or selfish games, 
strategies A and I are switched in Figure 6.   23 
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Figure 1.  Four faces of the Prisoners’ Dilemma Number of providers other than i 
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Figure 2.  6-person provision and altruism game    2 
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Figure 3.  Three alternative two-game combinations 
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Figure 4.  Three additional two game combinations 
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Table 1.  Dominant strategy in each 3 × 3 PD combination 
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